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| MAIL CONTROL RECORD | | Rec'd 5/20/55 | No. Nº 1366 |
| FROM: State Dept. | | | Date: 5/19/55 |
| Terry B. Sanders | | | |
| ADC | S: 25X1A9a | Copy 61 | |
| | Memo for [REDACTED] | SECRET Attachment | File: |
| SUBJECT: | | | Suspense Date: |
| Incloses copy of Paris telegram POLTO 2253, May 10, 1955, which is sent to members of Working Group on the Four Power Conference. | | | 25X1A9a |
| | | | 1. [REDACTED] |
| REMARKS: | | | 2. |
| | | | 3. |
| | | | 4. |
| Action Taken | | | |
| Acknowledgement | Date: | | |
| Reply: | Date: | | |
| NAN: | OTHER: | | |

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
P

May 19, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Donald Irwin
The White House

Attached is copy of Paris telegram
POLTO 2253, May 10, 1955, which is sent
to members of the working group on the
Four Power Conference.

T.B.S.

Terry B. Sanders, Jr.

Attachment:

Paris POLTO 2253, May 10, 1955
(copy no. 61)

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 2253, MAY 10, 2 PM

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FROM USDEL

ON SUGGESTION NORWAY BELGIUM NETHERLANDS AFTERNOON NAC SESSION MAY 9 ON AGENDA ITEM II (A) (B) (C) WAS RESTRICTED TO FONMINS PERM REPS PLUS THREE ADVISERS EACH DEL (MERCHANT BOWIE MAC-ARTHUR). FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION. SUMMARY OF REST OF MEETING WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY:

SECRETARY OPENED BY SAYING HE AGREED WITH WHAT MANY OF PREVIOUS SPEAKERS HAD INTIMATED AND WHAT PEARSON HAD STATED EXPLICITLY THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR THE WEST TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE. IT IS APPROPRIATE TO PRESS SOVIETS FOR SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS WHICH DESPERATELY CALL FOR SOLUTION. FEELING ON PART OF ALL OUR PEOPLE IS THAT IT IS TIME TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE. OFTEN THE PEOPLE HAVE A SENSE OF RIGHTNESS AND JUDGMENT ABOUT THESE MATTERS WHICH IS NOT ALWAYS RAPIDLY REFLECTED IN THE VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL LEADERS.

THE QUESTION NOW IS WHAT KIND OF INITIATIVE SHOULD BE TAKEN AND HOW CAN IT BE TAKEN WITHOUT AVOIDING THE DANGERS REFERRED TO BY SPAAK THIS MORNING.

THE FIRST POINT IS THAT FOR HISTORICAL REASONS IT RESTS WITH A FEW OF THE NATO MEMBERS TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN THE INITIAL STAGE BUT THAT ANY SUCH INITIATIVE BY A FEW CAN ONLY BE LIMITED TO OPENING UP THE PROBLEMS. NO SMALL OR LIMITED GROUP OF COUNTRIES CAN TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS IN WHICH OTHERS HAVE A REAL INTEREST AND ARE PERHAPS EVEN MORE INTIMATELY CONCERNED. THE PRESENT SITUATION IS NOT LIKE THAT OBTAINING DURING THE

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Authority: HR 73-2
☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest
Date 23 JUNE 82 Reviewer 103420

CAUSE MILLIONS

A SECOND PROBLEM WHICH HE BELIEVED SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS WAS THE REPRESSION OF HUMAN AND NATIONAL RIGHTS IN THE CAPTIVE STATES. IN ANY NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIETS IT IS IMPERATIVE TO AVOID THE DANGER OF CREATING IMPRESSION THAT WE ACCEPT A DIVIDED WORLD AND THE CONTINUING ENSLAVEMENT OF THE SATELLITES. IF WE CONVEY ANY SUCH IMPRESSION, WE WILL

SOMETHING WHICH CANNOT BE IGNORED. POWER OF MORAL INFLUENCE IN THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF MEN IS CONTINUED DIVISION OF GERMANY AND WOULD FINALLY PREVAIL. THE LED TO PRESENT PROSPECT FOR AUSTRIAN TREATY WOULD WORK AGAINST WITHIN OUR GRASP. HE BELIEVED THAT SAME MORAL FORCES WHICH HAD TREATY MUST BE LONG DEFERRED. IT NOW LOOKED AS IF TREATY WAS DECEMBER MOST PARTICIPANTS BELIEVED THAT HOPE FOR AUSTRIAN UNIFICATION HOPELESS. MENTIONED THAT AT NAC MEETING LAST AND WILL BE RESOLVED. HE DID NOT BELONG TO SCHOOL WHO BELIEVED FOREMOST WAS UNIFICATION OF GERMANY. HE BELIEVED THIS MUST BY NEW AND VIGOROUS MEANS. IN REPLY, HE SAID THAT FIRST AND ISOLATED AND IDENTIFIED AND TO WHICH SOLUTIONS MIGHT BE SOUGHT THE SECRETARY NEXT ASKED WHAT ARE PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT BE

LEFT FOR SOLUTION IN OTHER FORUMS SUCH AS THE U.N. BY NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS AND WHAT PROBLEMS HAD BEST BE CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVE ESTIMATING WHAT PROBLEMS MIGHT BE SOLVED CEDURAL AND NOT A SUBSTANTIVE INITIATIVE. SUCH PROCEDURAL WESTERN INITIATIVE BY SEVERAL POWERS MUST BE PRIMARILY PRO- AND MEANS TO BRING IN THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED. THEREFORE, IDENTIFY PROBLEMS CALLING FOR A SOLUTION AND THEN CONSIDER WAYS THAT THEY COULD DO WAS TO SIT DOWN WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE SECRETARY THEN ASKED WHAT A FEW COULD DO. HE FELT THE MOST

THE PROPER TIME. SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS IN WHICH THEY HAVE A REAL INTEREST AT OTHERS. ALL COUNTRIES CONCERNED MUST BE BROUGHT INTO THE A FEW CANNOT ASSUME TO DEAL WITH AND DISPOSE OF THE RIGHTS OF WAR POWERS CUTTING ACROSS THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS. TO SUMMARIZE, THIS IS NOT THE TIME FOR A SMALL GROUP OF COUNTRIES TO EXERCISE STANCES THAT FEW COUNTRIES MAKE DECISIONS AFFECTING OTHERS. DURING THE WAR WHEN IT WAS IMPERATIVE BECAUSE OF THE CIRCUM-

-2- POLTO 2253, MAY 10, 2 PM, FROM PARIS

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-3- POLTO 2253, MAY 10, 2 PM, FROM PARIS

CAUSE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE TO GIVE UP HOPE. HE BELIEVED THAT THE REPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SATELLITES SHOULD BE SOLVED NOT BY VIOLENCE BUT BY THE SAME FORCES WHICH EXERTED SUCH AN INFLUENCE IN THE AUSTRIAN CASE. TODAY THE STATE OF UNREST IN THE SATELLITES IS GREATER THAN EVER BEFORE. THIS IS INSURANCE FOR THE WEST BECAUSE IF UNHAPPILY SOVIETS BEGAN A WAR, THEIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION WOULD BE THREATENED BY SATELLITE UNREST. THEREFORE, WEST SHOULD DISCUSS THE POSITION OF SATELLITES IN TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS IN ORDER TO LET CAPTIVE PEOPLES KNOW WE DID NOT ACCEPT THEIR PERMANENT ENSLAVEMENT. SECRETARY SAID IN ALLEVIATING CONDITIONS IN THE SATELLITE STATES HE DID NOT ENVISAGE ATTEMPT TO CREATE A HOSTILE CORDON SANITAIRE AROUND THE SOVIET UNION BUT TO WORK TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RELATIONSHIP THAT IS COMPATIBLE WITH FREE AND DECENT RELATIONS SUCH AS THE RELATIONSHIP OF FINLAND.

THE SECRETARY THEN SAID ATOMIC THREAT OCCUPIES THE MINDS OF ALL OUR PEOPLES. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE PRESIDENT HAD DESIGNATED ONE OF OUR LEADING OFFICIALS TO OCCUPY HIMSELF WITH THE QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT, WHICH IS A VERY COMPLEX SUBJECT. HE FELT THAT USEFUL WORK MIGHT BE DONE WITH THE SOVIETS ON DISARMAMENT PERHAPS THROUGH THE U.N. OR OTHERWISE.

THE BURDEN OF ATLANTIC COMMUNITY ARMAMENT IS HEAVY AND WHILE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO REDUCE THIS BURDEN NOW IF SOME NEW SYSTEM OF ARMS LIMITATION SHOULD BE DEvised THE BURDEN MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY BE SOMEWHAT LESSEned. THIS MIGHT BE A TASK FOR NATO.

THERE IS ALSO THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM ABOUT WHICH HE WOULD TALK LATER. NOW THERE ARE NOT ADEQUATE PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH FAR EAST PROBLEMS BUT LATER PERHAPS SOME PROCEDURE COULD BE FOUND.

SECRETARY SUMMARIZED BY SAYING ABOVE ARE KIND OF PROBLEMS FOR WHICH THERE ARE NO QUICK AND HASTY SOLUTIONS. TO CREATE IMPRESSION THAT THEY COULD BE SOLVED IN DAYS OR WEEKS WOULD BE ILLUSORY AND RESULT IN OUR FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF LETTING DOWN OUR GUARD. INITIALLY, WE SHOULD NOT TRY TO DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE COMPLEX PROBLEMS BUT ASCERTAIN HOW WE CAN GO

ABOUT FINDING

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ABOUT FINDING SOLUTIONS MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN IN THE PAST. HE REEMPHASIZED THAT ALL WHO ARE DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH ANY PROBLEM MUST PARTICIPATE IN ITS SOLUTION, THAT THERE COULD BE NO DEALS BEHIND THEIR BACKS, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ABANDONMENT OF US POLICIES AS REGARDS ITSELF OR THIRD PARTIES. WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS TO APPROACH OUR PROBLEMS WITH NEW VIGOR AND HOPE AND DEVISE TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES ENABLING ORDERLY BUT NOT HASTY DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS. HE POINTED OUT THAT AS LONG AS MATTERS ARE UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST THERE IS MUCH LESS LIKELIHOOD OF ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO THE CALAMITY OF A GENERAL WAR.

PERKINS

FJS/33

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